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common attributes; for, if we regard the invariable concomitance
of certain qualities with certain other marks as proof of a common
origin in the objects possessing those marks, there is no reason
for setting any limit to the number of ways in which that com-
mon origin will be betrayed.
It is not meant to be implied in the foregoing, that in the case
of all " Natural Kinds" community of origin has been the actual
ground of classification, or even a subsequently found character.
To take what seems, in some respects, the simplest possible
instance, the chemical elements, there is not, within the present
writers' knowledge, any external evidence that all the sodium, for
example, in the universe was derived from a common stock ; but
it seems highly probable that either this is the case or else that
all the properties of sodium are deducible by general laws from a
few of them. In other words, the fact that all portions of matter
which possess a few of the properties of sodium do actually
possess all the other properties of sodium forces upon us the con-
viction that either the qualities or the objects have a real con-
nexion with each other. If the former is the case, the properties of
sodium are deductions from its molecular constitution; if the
latter, then sodium is in a very valid sense a Natural Kind—some-
thing very different from an arbitrary and " merely intellectual"
class : and this, whether one agrees or does not agree with the
present writers in regarding the connexion between the objects
to reside in a certain community of origin. In the case of the
animals forming a species, it would be preposterous to suppose
that all the common qualities might be explained deductively
from a few of them. These, then, form a Natural Kind, in the sense
in which we have used the term ; and, in this case, community of
origin has been sufficiently shown to be the true ground of the
classification. It is a matter of course that such classes are not
more but less rigidly marked off than arbitrary classes. The
quality of " naturalness " is attributed to them, not in virtue of
their boundaries being clearly marked out by nature, but because,
however indistinct the actual boundary may turn out to be, the
principle on which it is drawn points to a natural and not a
merely intellectual connexion among the objects it includes.
THE AIM OF INDUCTIVE EEASONING.
By JOSEPH SOLOMON.
Inductive Logic seems to me to be in a state of some confusion
at the present time. There is not perhaps much to be added in
the way of statement or elucidation to the general description of
the processes by which natural truths, other than mere facts of
observation, are attained to ; but there seems still to be much
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indistinctness in the logician's conceptions of the nature of the
truths the men of science aim at discovering. The current
description is that science aims at the discovery of Causes. Why
I consider this description unsatisfactory, and what I desire to
replace it by, I will shortly endeavour to show.
Cause is commonly understood to be prior to effect; the popular
name of a well-known fallacy ('Post hoc, ergopropter hoc') reminds
us of our common tendency to treat the earlier of two incidents
affecting the same material as the cause of the later. Recent dis-
cussion of this assumed priority of cause to effect has elicited
many true ideas, but has also tended to produce some degree of
mental unsettlement. I t is allowed we can constantly point to
incidents without which later incidents would not have occurred;
but we are reminded that much else also has to occur before the
later incident is matured, that the striking earlier incident which
we called the ' cause' is but a co-operating factor towards the
evolution of the effect and would be better described as a 'con-
dition,' to which other conditions must add themselves. But
when all these conditions are once simultaneously realised, is not
the result also realised coincidently with them ? So that it would
seem that the only true ' cause,' the ' assemblage of conditions,'
was not prior to the effect but contemporaneous with it: and indeed,
once this idea is broached, it seems to fall in with, and be a
necessary corollary to, our idea of Cause; for how can a cause
which does not produce its effect be called the cause of that effect
at all? But if again the idea in question be adopted, what
becomes of the current conception that a cause is prior to its
effect, or of the scholastic transmutation of this, that the relation
of cause and effect is nothing but a relation of invariable antece-
dence and sequence ?
The drift of the above remarks is that it would seem more
correct to describe science as the ascertainment of invariable
coincidences than as the ascertainment of invariable sequences.
But before saying more to justify this point of view, I wish to call
attention to a class of discovered scientific truths which it seems
still more difficult to range under the head of invariable sequences
or even to describe as laws of causation at all.
When we say that the detached apple falls to the ground
because the earth attracts it or that the heavenly bodies pursue
their orbits because they attract one another, no one doubts that
we here state a most profound and important discovery of the
human intellect; vulgarly it is even supposed that we have
attained in this case pre-eminently to the discovery of a cause, of
an efficient cause, that actually brings about its own result (like
the prophecies of Curran's criminal, who himself took in hand
their execution) and is not merely followed by it (like the
prophecies of other men). Science, however, deprecates any such
conception as anthropomorphic or worse than anthropomorphic,
as intending to attribute to the sun or earth the action of a man
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and in effect attributing to them something quite impossible to
man, namely, mechanical action at a distance. We have then to
say that, in assigning the attraction of the earth as the cause of
the fall of the apple, we are not merely restating the phenomenon
itself, but giving in our restatement a general view of it, a view of
it applicable to a vast variety of phenomena superficially quite dis-
similar to it, to which it is thus for the first time, and most use-
fully, assimilated. We have found a Law of Nature, the attraction
of all bodies to one another, but a law of which the phenomena
in question are not effects but exemplifications. I want now to
ask, Would it not be best to say that all discoveries of this class
are discoveries of Laws of Nature, the character of which is, that
they are endlessly and in endless forms exemplified in incidents ?
Thus the functions of scientific discovery appear to be (1) pre-
eminently generalisation, by which I understand the grouping of
one sort of phenomenon with phenomena of (apparently) other
sorts by the hypothetical or experimental detection of a common
principle in them ; (2) the ascertaining of invariable coincidences,
e.g., the occurrence of the electric spark, of explosion, &c, upon
the assemblage of certain conditions. I say 'pre-eminently
generalisation,' because the idea of generalisation must be the
guide and inspirer even of efforts at discovery made in direction (2).
And of course by generalisation I mean (as in fact I have already
tried to state) something more than the bare assertion that what
has happened now will always happen. It is matter of course, it
is the postulate of all study of nature whatever, that what has
happened now will always happen; whether the date be 1887 or
2887, what does that matter? No doubt, our experience often
misleads us ; no doubt, our memoranda of the past often lead us
to expect something that does not happen : but that can only be
from inaccuracy or incompleteness in those memoranda. We
think we have reported accurately, we think we have reported
fully what has happened, and we have not done so. If nature
is uniform, if nature can be studied, then one instance is as good
a proof as a thousand of the detailed phenomenon exhibited in
that instance; and if we endeavour precisely to repeat the
instance—as men of science constantly (one sometimes thinks
needlessly) do—it is because of their diffidence as to the accuracy
of their own narrative of what has occurred, especially when the
matter to be observed is minute, subtle and easily misread. There-
fore even in seeking new coincidences the student of nature always
does so with the hope of establishing something wider and more
general than the mere phenomenon he has observed or produced,
even though that be in itself startling and unexpected. He seeks,
we say, to discover its ' cause'; in fact he is trying to discover some
wider coincidence, one less burdened with detail, of which the one
before him may be regarded as an example, but of which there
may be other examples lying perhaps in fields apparently widely
separated from the present one.
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It thus appears that if—as we, no doubt, commonly say—it is
the function of inductive reasoning to discover ' causes,' the word
' cause ' is here used in a sense widely different from the common
one, even when that common one is refined and subtilised by
being explained as ' assemblage of conditions '. There can be no
doubt it is the function of science both to discover ' causes'—in
the sense in which we have last used the word—and to discover
' assemblages of conditions' under which some new state or
phenomenon is realised. I would suggest that the word ' cause'
be used for neither of these objects of scientific discovery. The
first kind of ' cause ' we might call ' reason' or ' principle,' and
say it is one function of science to discover the ' reasons' or
' principles ' of phenomena : for the second kind of ' cause ' we
might keep the name ' assemblage of conditions,' and say that it
is another function of science to discover such ' assemblages of
conditions,' or—to use language previously employed—to discover
natural or invariable ' coincidences '.
I have no such foolish wish as the desire to banish the word
' cause' from language altogether, though others have entertained
that aspiration. My point is, that it is a word not for scientific but
for practical use. The popular instinct seems to me most right in
clinging to the idea that the cause is prior to the effect, most
right in resisting, as bewildering and unsettling, the logician's
theory that cause, when fully scrutinised, is coincident and con-
temporaneous with effect. For practical purposes the time-
element is everything. We do not desire to state scientific ' coin-
cidences ' ; we do not desire to state with scientific precision what
must happen under certain circumstances. We desire to infer the
future from the present—in particular to infer our own individual
future from our present circumstances, and especially from our
present actions. I t is not less serviceable to point out that a
certain explosion was ' caused ' by a servant entering a gas-laden
room with a candle; though science on the one hand would not
stoop to particularise such a detail as the candle but would speak
generally of ' flame,' and on the other hand would seek to register
with a precision we do not aim at the whole set of circumstances
with which an explosion is necessarily coincident, or to which it
is necessarily annexed. We may serviceably warn a child against
over-eating to-day because such over-eating will ' cause ' indiges-
tion to-morrow, without any theory as to the kind of physical dis-
tress of which indigestion is an expression, and without any kind of
theory as to the connexion between such distress and overloading
the stomach. Therefore, to us in the practical management of
our lives, knowledge of ' causes,' in the old popular sense of
' cause,' is most important, and we may fairly, because serviceably,
speak of that which was done in the morning as the ' cause' of
that which happened in the evening. The man of science should
not. What we call the ' cause ' of the later incident is to him at
once too full and not full enough : not full enough, because he
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knows what a string of later circumstances and states must be
added before the effect is realised—a string not complete till the
effect is realised ; too full, because to the man of science with his
desire for the broadest, most general, most widely-applicable
modes of expression, our minute recital is needlessly and un-
bearably involved in detail.
The conclusion is—let us keep the word ' Cause' for the use of
practical, every-day life, and let the function of inductive science
be described as has been suggested above.
ETHICS AND THE IDEAL.
By Eev. W. L. DAVIDSON.
Ethics, taken in its proper signification, includes two things.
On the one hand, it consists of an investigation into the nature
and constitution of human character; and, on the other hand, it
is concerned with the formulating and enunciating of rules for
human conduct. In the first case, it is theoretical ethics; in the
second, practical. The practical is necessarily dependent on the
theoretical; for, in order to be a sure and trustworthy guide to
conduct, ere ever it can lawfully claim the authority of a coun-
sellor and help to man, Ethics must repose on a well-considered
analysis and investigation of man's mental and moral nature, as
well as of his social conditions. It is, therefore, in the closest
manner allied with psychology and with sociology; and the
methods of these two sciences are precisely those that stand us
in good stead here.
As compared with allied sciences, however, Ethics has a com-
plication peculiar to itself. It deals essentially with the ' ought'
as distinguished from the ' i s ' ; it is the science of human
character and human conduct as they should be, and not simply as
we actually find them. Nevertheless, as the ideal, in order to
be of any true value, must be founded on the real, the starting-
point for all ethical speculation must be human nature as it falls
actually within our ken. We must analyse and study the ' i s '
before we can safely proceed to the • ought to b e ' ; and, how-
ever far forward our ideality may carry us, it must both begin
from and return again to actual experience. The word ' ideality,'
however, is here somewhat ambiguous. It may refer simply to
an idea present in the mind, and not embodied in actuality; or
it may signify a highest or best conceivable state of things, partly
indeed realised but the full realisation of which is still future.
It is in the second sense that the word is here employed; and,
though this sense includes the other, it goes considerably
beyond it. An ideal is also an idea, though an idea need not by
any means be an ideal.
 at U
niversity of Sussex on Septem
ber 5, 2015
http://m
ind.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
